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N/\'l'IJRE OF THE C/\SE 
Consideration of a sinCJle issue of Vdlidity of a 
tender to satisfy a judqment and terminate judgment 
interest durinCJ time consumed by an appeal of the 
JUdgm0nt to the Supreme Court. 
-1-
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DI SPOSITTON !W TllE 'l'RI TIL COURT 
F'oJlo"•ing the enlry of money judqmr'nt .iy<1tn:-;t 
Respondents and in behalf of l\ppell<lnt, 1\ppelLrnL ftle·a 
an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Upon entry of Rem1tt1tur, the CdS(' wets rc'turnocJ 1,, 
the Millard County Clerk. 
issued. The Respondents then tendered, to the !11 llard 
County Clerk, two checks; one in the sum CJf $62,557.% 
representing the principal amount of the <Jr HJ in al JUdgmer": 
and one in the sum of $9 ,724.05 representing interest 
earned on the principal judqment amount during the time 
consumed by the initial appcill. l\fler hoar1nq •)11 the 
que:;tiun of inlerest due, tt .. 'l'rtdl Court t'fllvrvu 1uu•1nirr,' 
in behaJf of the H.espondcnts sdtisfyinq and relecJs1nq t 
judgment against thP Respondents tor the paymc:nt of the 
principal amount of $62,SS7.96 and return1nq t!H: inttrcsc 
sum to the Respondents; tne Cvurt f tnding intc'rest ltJd 
been terminated by a tendered payment of the JUdqm<'nt 
amount prior to the filing of the first <lppeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT Ot~ l\PPEAL 
'!'he Defendant-1\ppellant seeks the following relief 
on c1ppeat: 
l. Reversal of the Trial Court's rulinlJ disa!Jow1nq 
the claim of the Appellant for Judgment interest. 
2. Reversal of the Trial Court's ruling ordering 
the entry of Satisfaction of Judgment. 
J. l\n Order directing the Trial Court to reinstate 
the Judgment granted to the Appellant, including interest 
thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the 
Judgment until paid in full, and givinq Respondents rrudtt 
th<:rc:un for lhe $G2,S'i7.9l· µuid un June 11, l')7'J. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 1, 1977, the Trial Court entered a money 
judgment against the Plaintiffs-Respondents and in behalf 
of the Defendant-Appellant. (R. 180-lBJ) The tolal amount 
of the judgment was in the sum of $62, 557 .96 and by its 
terms earned interest at the rate of 8% per annum. The 
judgment further provided that certain corporate stock 
belonging to the Plaintiffs-Respondents, consisting of 10 
shares of the Finlinson-Oder Corporation, be sold by way of 
foreclosure to satisfy the judgment. On August 2, 1977, 
Defendant-Appellant secured from the Court an Order of 
Execution (R. 184) directing the Sheriff of Millard County 
to collect the amount of judgment in cash and, if unable to 
do so, to sell said corporate stock at a time certain. Tht 
Execution was served upon the Plaintiffs-Respondent,; on 
August 5, 1977, cash was not paid, and the Sheriff ljJVC tiie 
Plaintiffs-Respondents notice that he would sell their 
Finlinson-Oder Corporation stock at a Sheriff's sale on 
August 11, 1977. 
On the morning of August 11, 1977, according to the 
testimony of the parties given at the hearing before the 
Trial Court on June 19, 1979, the following took place: 
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TESTIMONY OF LYLE D. ODER, June 19, 1979 transcript: 
(.!. You were present on August the 11th of 1977, in the 
Millard County Courthouse in the morning of approximately 
the hour of Ten a .m.? 
/\. I was. 
Q. And for what purpose had you come herel 
A. I came there with you, to tell the Sheriff to 
continue the sale that had been set up, that we were going 
to appeal. 
Q. And on that morning, did you neet with the Sheriff? 
A. I did. 
Q. -And could you tel 1 us upproximately hat time it was? 
A. 9:30, 9:45. Somewhere along in there. 
Q. Okay. And where did you meet the Sheriff that 
morning'? 
A. In the Sheriff's office, which is in a different 
place than it is now, just inside and to the right when you 
come in the front door. 
Q. Okay. And who was present at that time'? 
A. ~yself and you, my counsel, and the Sheriff, 
probably a deputy or two around. 
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Paqe c 
Q. Okay. And did you have a conversation with the 
Sheriff at that time? 
A. I think you did all the talking. mc1y have 
commented to the Sheriff, I don't remember. 
Q. Okay. And were you present to that conversation: 
A. I was. 
Q. Now, prior to that time or at that time, had you 
seen the defendant or his counsel, Eldon Eliason? 
A. On that date I had not. 
Q. Okay. Could you te 11 us what you told the Sheriff 
and what you heard in the conversation with the Sheriff at 
that ti me? 
A. I told the Sheriff that the sale would be continuec 
that we are going to appeal the case. 
Q. Now, following that conversation, what happcneu: 
A. We stood around there for awhile, and d~rectly i'!r. 
Finlinson and his attorney appeared. 
Q. Okay. And was there a conversation between 1'-lr • 
Finlinson, yourself, and his legal counsel? 
A. ThPre was a general conversation, you, me, Mr· 
and Finlinson, his counsel. I'm sure the Sheriff was there 
participated in it. 
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Q. Okay. l\nd do you recall approx1mately what time 
it was that that conversation took place? 
1\. l\lmost exactly ten minutes before 10:00 o'clock, 
the scheduled time of the sale. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay, and where did that conversation take place? 
In the little entry way right out there by the 
by the front entrance to the Courthouse. 
Q. Okay. And do you recall what was said by the 
parties? 
A. Yes, I do. The first comment was Mr. Eliason, 
he said, "We have got the money; where's the stock·?" 
Q. Okay. And than what was said after that! 
/\. You told him th,il th<' s.ile WdS qolll<J to l><! •·unt ll1U!!U, 
that we decided to appeal the case. 
him, that I can recall. 
That is all you told 
Q. And did he or Mr. Finlinson make any c01;iment at 
that point? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And did the Sheriff make any comment at 
that poinU 
/\. Not that I recall. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Okay. And then what was done? 
A. Hr. Eliason or Mr. Finlinson, between tlw two of 
them, they had two cashier's checks, c1nd thPy 1·1ere passed 
from their hand to yours and you looked c1l ltH'rn dllU 11,111011 
them to me. I looked at them and handed lher;i back to yo~. 
You gave them back to Mr. Eliason. 
Q. Was there any comment made during that tim~ 
A. There was. 
Q. Tell us what you heard. 
A. After you handed the checks back to h1r;i, you told 
Mr. Eliason that if he wanted interest not to run on that 
judgment, that he should deposit the checks with the Count, 
Clerk; and if he took the money back and didn't Je,ive it 
on deposit there, that interest would continue to run. 
Q. Was there any reply to that? 
A. Not that I heard. Mr. Eliason and i·lr. F1nlinson 
went off and conferred about that a little bit, but I don': 
recall hearing any comment back from them in response to 
that. 
Q. Was there any other conversations that morning at 
the place, that you recall? 
A. No. 
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Q. Okay. And what was done at ter thal? 
A. We all went our separate ways. 
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TESTIMONY OF BURNIS FINLINSON, June 19, 1979 transcript: 
Q. And did you attend the execution sale of August 
the 11th, 1977? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who was present with you, if anyone, when you 
attended that execution sale? 
A. Oh, my counsel, my wife, and sons. 
Q. And did you, at that day, talk to the Sheriff 
relative to any costs on execution? 
1\. Yes. 
Q. And did you on that date .see Mr. Lyle Oder or/and 
Mr. Milton Ilarmon, his attorney? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when and where was --- what time of day was it 
that you saw those people? 
A. Oh, shortly before 10:00 o'clock in the morning 
down in the foyer. 
Q. (Ely Mr. Eliason) All right, about what time was it• 
that you observed Mr. Oder and Mr. Harmon 01, t;hctt particular 
day? 
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~. Oh, probably quarter to ten. 
Q. All right. Now, you stated the time of day, and 
you've stated who was present. Did you hciVe ciny d1scuss 1,. 
at that time with the defendant and hjs leqal counsel! 
A. No special conversation, only tcndc.'r<·d tlwm lhr 
money, gave them the check, the cashier's checks. 
Q. And what money did you give and to whom did you 
give it? 
A. We gave the two ca.shier' s checks to ~r. Harmon an; 
Mr. Oder in the amount of $62,557.96. 
Q. (By Mr. Elia.son) Did they made wny comwc~1ts ?ft, 
delivering to them the $62 ,557.9~ 
THE COURT: You answer that 11 yes 11 or "no 11 • ])J d l he1 
make any comment? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
'l'HE COURT: All right. 
Q. (By Mr. Eliason) What was said, if you recall! 
A. They said it was a lot of money. And there was nc 
objection to the amount, just that .i. t was a lot of money. 
Q. What happened after that, if anything? 
A. They took the checks and then they, in private, 
discussed what to do. t.h ey handed And when they came back, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the checks back, and said they wouldn't accept them. 
Q. Did they give you any reason for not accepting them? 
THE COURT: Who spoke and what was said? 
MR. ELIASON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: When you say, "they said", it connotes 
that they did it in unison ---
THE WITNESS: They about did. 
THE COURT: --- like singing a song. 
Q. (By Mr. Eliason) Would you try and delineate who 
was speaking there, Mr. Finlinson? 
A. T think that Mr. Harmon did the speaking, said 
that they would continue the sale at a later date; that 
they would appeal it to the Supreme Court, the decision that 
had been made, and they returned the money to us. 
Q. Then what did you do with the money thereafter, I 
me .:m , on that day? 
A. Well, it was given back to the Sheriff and then the 
Sheriff gave it to me and then 1 returned it to the people 
I had got it from. 
Q. And what did you tell the Sheriff, if anything! 
Did you deliver any paper to him! 
A. Not that I remember. 
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(.J. Was there anything said allout any further discus:. 
with him? 
A. Well, only that it was discussed whether the .sal; 
should go forward or not. And he was <ldviscd lly ,.tr. ILHmcr 
that they would not hold the S<lle at this date and it wou:c 
be continued later. 
Q. I' 11 ask you whether or not at the deliverrn'l of 
the tendering of the $62 ,557.00 there was conversdt1on rel; 
to the return of your stock? 
Q. (By Mr. Eliason) All right, what was said with 
regard to that, Mr. Finlinson? 
A. That he had the stock and would keep it. 
In addition to this event, the facts dre that the; 
$b2,5'>7.9b was returned to Mr. Finlin:;on whu d1vc:rt1·d ti 
as t<'nciered p<1yment. of thP iucJqmcnl to u:;c 111 111:; 1Ju:>1nt'.''" 
(T. l'~-16) and he then filed a cross-a~pc'aJ. ( 1<. 7 -·JI 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: TllE OFFER 'l'O PAY $62 557 .96 ON AUGIJS'l' l l 
1977 WAS CONDITIONAL, DID NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL TENDER, AND 
DID NOT TERMINATE THE INTEREST PROVISION OF THE JUDGMEN1~ 
Following this transaction on August 11, 1977 an 
Appec1l was perfected by Oder and a Cross-Appeal by 
Finlinson and there were questions presented to this Court 
by way of motion to dismiss the Oder Appeal which are 
pertinent to the present consideration: 
(A) Did oder have the right to appeal when he had 
secured an Execution and Sheriff's Sale? Finlinson moved 
to dismiss the Appeal al Legi.ny that the .:in.swcr to th<lt 
4uestion was "no"; but this Court did not agree and theo 
motion was denied. Cder had the right to appeal bec~use 
i~he Supreme Court sa::_d, in a prior case - Sierra Nevada 
P. 943, that the right ta appeal exists: 
whAn the amount found in favor of a litigant 
by a iudgment or decree is due him in any event - when 
there is no controversy over his right to receive 
and retain it - so that the only question to be 
detcrmjned by the appeallate tribunal is wbether he 
is or J s not entitled to a greater or an additional 
sum. 11 
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The point of the above is this: On August 11, 1977 
Oder had the right to be paid, by Finlinson, the $62,557.%, 
to appeal the interest questiqn (The only question to be 
determined by the appeallate tribunal being whether he is 
or is not entitled to a greater or an additional sum.), 
and to retain the Finlinson--Oder Corpordlion slock pledged 
as security for any addition al amounts which may L>e awardeJ 
as a result of the Appeal. Under such circumstances, if 
the tendered S 62, 55 7. 96 is not continuing but is diverted 
to Finlinson 's business uses, then the judgment interest 
continues and is not terminated. 
( B) Was the S 62, 55 7. ~6 offered with these rights in 
mind? No. Finlinson required an exchange of stock for 
the money. Thus the offer was condition al. It required, ii 
if accepted under the terms of "We have got the money, where' 
the stock?" (T. 23 L. 19), that Oder part with his right 
to hold security. A conditional offer is not a tender and 
does not act to terminate interest. See Zions Proper~ 
Inc. vs. Forrest c. Holt Utah (197SJ 538 P2d. 1319. 
"A tender required that there be a bond fide• 
unc0nditional offer oi payment of the amount of 
money due, coupled with an actual production of 
the money or its equivalent." (Emphasis added.) 
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POINT II: A VALID SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT TENDER 
MUST llE A CONTINUING OFFER, CON'rINlJOUSLY FINANCIALLY 
SUPPORTED IF IT IS TO TERMINATE THE RUNNING OF JUDGMEN'I' 
INTEREST. 
This point is emphasized by the case law cited in 
Hansen vs. Christensen, Utah (1976) 545 P2d. 1152, where 
the Court found a valid tender to a real estate purchase 
contract was made by the deposit with a local bank of a 
cashier's check to the sellers' order. That case by 
contrast applies to the present facts. In the case before 
the Court there was a showing of cashier's checks and the 
instructions, "If he wanted interest not to run on that 
Judgment, that he should deposit the checks with the County 
Clerk and if he took the money back and didn't leave it on 
deposit there, that interest would continue to run." 
(T. 24 L. 10) With those instructions the money was taken 
back. No deposit was made. Therefore, no valid tender. 
Utah law allows such deposits and provides as follows: 
78-27-4. MONEY DEPOSITED IN COURT - If money is 
deposited in Court, it must be paid to the Clerk, 
who must deposit it with the County Treasurer, by 
him to be held subject to the Order of the Court. 
For the safekeeping of the money so deposited 
with him, the Treasurer is liable on his official 
bond. 
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Note the statute provides for "111ont>y" und t hf' safe-
keeping thereof. Here no money parted from Finlinson', 
hands for continuing tender. 
Further, there was no cont1nu1ny f1ndncial suµport 
for the purported tender. No doubt Finl1nson had Sii/,·-,,1. 
in hcrnd on August 11, 1977 but ,1ftPr th.it cL1y hc· d1vcrt,·J 
the money for his own use - first to terminate interest 
on a loan upon which interest was at d hHJher rate than 
the 8% judgment earnings (T. 6 L. 3 and L. 20) di1d seconu, 
he used the money in his own uusiness. (T. 1'' L. 251 
These facts fall within the law announced by the 
Supreme Court in the case of Cole vs. Cole lltilh (J9421 
122 P2d. 201, where a check was deposited w1lh the ~11lldrJ 
County Clerk but was not held to be d valid tender to 
terminate interest; the Court stilting: 
"As has heretofore been stated, the tender made is 
not good unless the tender is a continuing good 
tender. Winslow C. Cole did not show that he has 
suffered a loss because the check was not present~ 
for payment within a reasonable time after its issue 
because he himself testified that he had used the 
money supporting the check to his own benefit." 
Finlinson did as Cole. He used the money of his µur· 
ported tender to his own benefit and further f1l 0 d a 
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Cross-Aµ~eal to this Court. 
The principal of law is one of ec.iuity ana JU<.tice 
and goes to the question of actual loss or harm whJch may 
have been sufferea. Under these facts, with Finlinson's 
diversior of the funds to his own use to terminate a higher 
interest rate and to finance his own husiness, he has tad 
the full use and benefit of his mo~1ey to his fi:-ianci<1l gc.in 
with no loss. See 74 Am Jur 2d 566. 
"The loss is one of natural justice. A debtor is 
released from the payment of interest on the 
supposition that he has been deprived of the use 
of the money by holding himself in r,,acJ i ness all 
the time to pay his creditor on the dem<lnd of the 
latter." 
As specified above, Finlinson was not deprived but 
rather was enhanced by his personal use of his money 
which was not held in readiness at all times to pay the 
judgment but which was diverted to his own use. It was 
rather Oder who suffered the loss of not having the tender 
deposited with the County Clerk or other acceptable officers, 
earning interest from the bank, until the Appeal and Cross-
Appeal concluded. 
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CONCLUSION 
'I'he Judyment granted the /\ppelLrnl f,yl<e D. Oder 
by its terms, earned interest at the rate of 8% per annur, 
until paid. Tender of payment can terminate the interest 
earning provision of the judgment if such tender is an 
unconditional offer of payment of the amount of moneyd~, 
coupled with an actual production of the money or lts 
equivalent, and if such offer is continuing and f inanc1alli 
supported. If an offer is made and there the money 
produced in support thereof is withdrawn and diverted to 
other uses inconsistent with the sat i sf .ict ion of the 
judgment; there has been no term1nation o'. the 1ntferest 
earning provision of the judgment dnd the JUU<Jment., rnclud::: 
the interest provision, continues in full force and effect 
until paid in full. The offer of pdyment made iJy Finlinsoi: 
was withdrawn, the money was diverted to his own private 
use, and thus there was no val id interest termination tenae:. 
The Trial Court erred in finding the interest terminated. 
Its judgment at that point should be reversed. 
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